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By WANG LEI 
F ollowing president-elect Joe Biden’s statement that the United States would rejoin the 2015 Iran nuclear deal if 
Teheran returns to full compliance, 
China’s Deputy Permanent Rep-
resentative to the United Nations 
Geng Shuang told ambassadors at a 
Security Council briefi ng on nuclear 
nonproliferation on Dec 22 that the 
other parties to the Iran deal should 
fulfi ll their commitments.
Although the Teheran leader-
ship, too, has said that it is ready 
to return to full compliance with 
the landmark nuclear deal as soon 
as the other parties honor their 
commitments, Iran faces a precari-
ous situation, particularly after the 
assassination of its leading nuclear 
scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh on 
Nov 27.
Despite being forced to adopt an 
increasingly hard-line stance against 
Israel and the US, Iran cannot 
take any retaliatory action against 
Fakhrizadeh’s killing, because that 
would make it even more diffi  -
cult for Biden to lift the sanctions 
against Teheran and jumpstart 
diplomacy. Yet, if Iran does not do 
anything to “avenge” Fakhrizadeh’s 
death, its retaliation threats would 
sound hollow to not only other play-
ers in the region, especially its rivals, 
but also the Iranian people.
Along with the assassination of 
Qassem Soleimani, the leader of 
Iran’s elite military force and one 
of the most powerful leaders of 
the country in January 2020, and 
an explosion that destroyed Iran’s 
nuclear facilities in Natanz in July, 
the Iranian scientist’s killing seems 
to have put Teheran in a spot. As 
such, the future of US-Iran relations, 
which nose-dived after the Donald 
Trump administration pulled the US 
out of the nuclear deal and launched 
its “maximum pressure” campaign, 
seems uncertain.
Despite declaring that it would no 
longer abide by the nuclear deal’s 
restrictions after the US pulled out 
of the pact, Teheran, of late, has 
reportedly reduced its involvement 
in Iraq and Syria in the hope that 
the incoming US administration will 
lift the sanctions.
But the assassination of Fakhriza-
deh has cast a shadow on the future 
of US-Iran ties.
Though no group has claimed 
responsibility for Fakhrizadeh’s 
assassination, Iran claims Israel was 
behind it. Israel’s intelligence agency 
Mossad has been involved in the 
killings of several Iranian scientists 
in the past decade, and Israel and 
the US jointly planned a cyberat-
tack that damaged Iran’s centrifuges 
through a computer worm called 
“Stuxnet” in 2010.
Considering the close ties 
between the US and Israel, which 
have further deepened during 
Trump’s presidency, if Israel had a 
hand in Fakhrizadeh’s killing, the 
US likely knew about it in advance.
The assassination is a political 
challenge for Iran, as it has exposed 
the loopholes in its intelligence and 
security, and prompted Iranian 
hard-liners to demand that the 
government take reciprocal action. 
That has put President Hassan 
Rouhani’s moderate government in 
a dilemma. But by targeting Israel 
or US facilities in the Middle East, 
Iran will only add fuel to the fi re in 
the region.
Also, the moderates seem to be 
losing support among the Iranian 
public, as was evident in hard-liners 
winning a majority of seats in the 
parliamentary election in Febru-
ary — raising fears that a hard-liner 
could win the Iranian presidential 
election in June 2021.
Resolving the Iranian nuclear 
issue is an extremely diffi  cult task. 
The Trump administration’s maxi-
mum pressure dashed Iran’s hope of 
being free of international sanctions 
in return for pledging to not develop 
any nuclear weapons.
To press the other fi ve signatories 
to the nuclear deal (the four other 
permanent UN Security Council 
members plus Germany) to fulfi ll 
their requirements, Iran has been 
gradually reducing compliance with 
the pact. For example, in July 2019, 
Iran announced the breaking of 
the 300-kilogram limit for enriched 
uranium stock and the 3.67 percent 
limit for uranium enrichment. On 
Nov 5, 2019, it announced the acti-
vation of the centrifuges at the For-
dow facility. And on Jan 5, 2020, it 
announced that it would no longer 
honor the nuclear deal’s terms.
Besides, the nuclear scientist’s 
killing could prompt Iran to further 
intensify its nuclear program, jeop-
ardizing the chances of any talks on 
the full revival of the nuclear deal.
In fact, two days after Fakhriza-
deh’s death, the Iranian parliament 
passed a bill, “Strategic Action to 
Lift Sanctions”, aimed at enriching 
uranium to 20 percent and above. 
If Iran succeeds in doing so, it 
would be the most serious breach 
of the nuclear deal. It seems for-
eign attacks on its leading fi gures, 
including top scientists, have made 
Iran more determined to make the 
nuclear program a success.
Another challenge for Iran is the 
deteriorating external environment. 
Still, many expect Iran to exercise 
restraint until Jan 20, when Biden 
is scheduled to take the oath of 
offi  ce as US president. Perhaps 
Middle East countries opposed 
to Iran are using the last days of 
Trump’s presidency to launch a bar-
rage of attacks against Iran to force 
it to retaliate and thus jeopardize 
the chances of resolving the dis-
putes with the US through peaceful 
dialogue.
If Iran’s strategic tolerance gives 
way to desperation, and it launches 
revenge attacks, the Middle East 
will become even more turbulent.
But if it continues to exercise 
restraint, the period from Janu-
ary, when Biden assumes offi  ce, to 
June, when Iran holds presidential 
election, could provide Teheran 
and Washington the opportunity to 
hold negotiations to settle their dis-
putes, leading to the revival of the 
Iran nuclear deal.
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I n its endeavor for a global community of shared future, China over the years has brought the world the Belt 
and Road Initiative, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation mecha-
nism and the Forum on China-Afri-
ca Cooperation among other things. 
The Muslim countries have great 
potential for inclusive cooperation 
in the mechanisms. 
An ineluctable inclusiveness is 
emerging in China’s BRI economic 
projects that can encompass all the 
Muslim economies in Asia. Indeed 
Chinese President Xi Jinping hap-
pened to unveil both the Silk Road 
Economic Belt and the 21st Mari-
time Silk Road in Muslim countries, 
the fi rst in Kazakhstan in September 
2013, and the other in October 2013 
in Indonesia with the world’s largest 
single-nation Muslim population.
Collectively, the Asian Muslim 
economies, either rich or develop-
ing, are simultaneously large con-
sumer markets as well as suppliers 
of raw materials. So it is obvious 
that China and the Asian slice of 
the Muslim world cannot shrug off  
each other for practical benefi ts on 
either side. 
On regionalism, the SCO has 
been fostering closer ties between 
China and the regional Muslim 
countries. It is believed by some 
that in the wake of growing unilat-
eralism by the United States after 
the end of the Cold War, SCO is an 
attempt to bring the Far East and 
Central Asia together for lasting 
stability and peace. 
Therefore, while maintaining 
traditional relations with the West, 
the Muslim countries may fi nd SCO 
more attractive to increase their 
collective power for global balance. 
And on globalism, the Chinese-
led BRICS initiative (comprising 
Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa) as well as the China-
Africa cooperation agenda to rep-
resent the global East and South 
cannot bypass the vast majority 
of Muslim economies, people and 
societies that fall within the arena. 
If BRICS is taken to represent 
an Eastward movement of civili-
zational cycle from the West, the 
Muslim world is bound to march 
with BRICS due to geographical 
and civilizational proximities. 
Throughout history, the Muslim 
world has been partnering with 
China for mutual development 
not only of each other, but also of 
Europe and Africa. 
Apart from China’s ever increas-
ing trade deals, China depends 
heavily for gas and petroleum on 
Muslim countries in the Arab pen-
insula, Iran and Central Asia. The 
South and Southeast Asian Muslim 
countries are also huge raw mate-
rial suppliers as well as markets for 
Chinese industrial products.
In return, Chinese policies on for-
eign aid and exchange are generally 
dominated by partnership, political 
equality, and win-win cooperation 
in contrast with the Western poli-
cies of conditionalities and imposi-
tion of sanctions on countries like 
Iran, Sudan and Syria on political 
grounds. 
The Christian West tends to 
treat its relation with the Muslim 
world in terms of civilizational 
confl ict, while China looks at such 
relations from cooperation perspec-
tive. Therefore, China’s relations 
are based on non-intervention in 
domestic aff airs, an approach that 
makes it more popular and accept-
able in the Muslim countries as a 
reliable partner for development.
However, the Muslim world is 
now more divided over the role of 
the West due to the latter’s succes-
sive devastation of Iraq, Afghani-
stan, Libya, Syria and Yemen, and 
continuous denial of emancipation 
from Western-backed authori-
tarianism and a solution to Israeli 
occupation of Palestine. 
For political stability the Muslim 
world is in search of a more reliable 
partner. If the civilizational cycle of 
the past two and a half millennia is 
to renew, then it is logical that the 
next civilizational candidate is China 
which needs supporting sojourners.
All these and other indicators 
only strengthen the age-old China-
Muslim world inter-acquaintance 
and relationship further. In the con-
temporary time, China as a lead-
ing power in the eastward shift of 
civilizational cycle is acquiring the 
trust of the Muslim countries for 
being non-interventionist in their 
domestic aff airs. 
Clearly, the Muslim world might 
increasingly fi nd China as a reliable 
partner in both development and 
politics. If the present trend con-
tinues, then the durable tradition 
of Islamic-Confucian bonds and a 
greater partnership building will 
apparently be more plausible for 
each other’s interests. 
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